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Environment
• Ubiquitous computing environment …
• Assumed to mean an environment in which 
multiple devices, some personal, some mobile, 
combine to provide an all-pervasive computing 
and communications service to end-users.
• Requires automatic configuration of certain 
aspects of some devices, since it is assumed 
that there may be no global management 
infrastructure.
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On privacy
• It is important to distinguish between security and 
privacy.
• Privacy is not just a special case of security – there are 
interesting interactions between security and privacy.
• It is important to appreciate that security and privacy are 
different notions – indeed the two sometimes conflict.
• Examples of conflicts:
– accountability versus anonymity;
– denial of service resistance versus anonymity.
• It is nevertheless true that supporting privacy requires 
the provision of security services, e.g. confidentiality for 
stored and transmitted data, and access control. 
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What is the problem?
• Before trying to decide how to provide and 
support privacy in a mobile health environment, 
we need to decide what privacy issues can 
arise.
• This requires identifying where Personally 
Identifying Information (PII) is at risk of 
disclosure.
• Note that disclosure can occur in a variety of 
ways (e.g. linking of sensitive information to a 
unique identifier, or collection of a ‘profile’ for an 
unidentified individual, which may eventually be 
linked to a particular individual).
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Mobile health care data model
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7Information Security Group
Health information handling
• Where in a mobile environment is sensitive 
information at risk?
– at point of capture of information, e.g. by individuals 
(e.g. physicians, paramedics) or automatically (e.g. 
using sensors);
– when stored/used in personal devices (e.g. smart 
card, sensor equipment, mobile phone);
– when stored/used in mobile third party devices (e.g. 
belonging to a physician or paramedic);
– when stored in fixed databases (e.g. in a hospital);
– when communicated between devices.  
8
Information Security Group
Mobile/pervasive computing – new 
challenges
• Many threats arising in a mobile environment 
are the same as those arising in a more 
conventional environment.
• However, we also have new threats, e.g.:
– mobile devices are more easily stolen;
– mobile devices typically offer less physical security;
– mobile devices may need to communicate with other 
devices where a single security infrastructure is not 
present (as might, for example, exist in a hospital);
– mobile devices may capture personal/medical 
information in a way not requiring user consent or 
knowledge.
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Identities
• A user may have many identities (with 
associated identifiers) for use with different third 
parties.
• For example:
– we all have a name (although this is typically not a 
unique identifier);
– an employee may have an employee number for use 
with his/her employer;
– a citizen has one or more numbers for interactions 
with government;
– a health care user may have a government ID (e.g. 
the NHS number in the UK), and one or more health 
insurance identifiers.
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Credentials
• To enable a provider of service to authenticate a 
user as a legitimate holder of an identity, the 
user may be required to provide one or more 
credentials.
• Possible credentials include:
– a password;
– a biometric sample;
– a public key certificate;
– a MAC computed using a shared secret key;
– a signature on a challenge provided by the service 
provider.
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Authorisation
• Once an entity has been authenticated, 
the provider needs to decide whether or 
not to grant the requested service.
• This is refereed to as authorisation (i.e. is 
the holder of this identity authorised to 
access this service?).
• This could, for example, be supported 
using server-held Access Control Lists 
(ACLs).
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Anonymity
• A user may wish to be able to access a service in an 
anonymous way.
• Anonymity means that no party will learn any of the 
identities of the user.
• Providing anonymity for free services is relatively simple.
• If service requires using stored data, then some level of 
identification to the stored data provider is required.
• If payment is needed, then an anonymous payment 
system is needed, e.g. cash or e-cash.
• True (‘absolute’) anonymity is difficult to achieve, since 
even revealing an IP address or a MAC layer address to 
some extent compromises it.
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Pseudonymity
• Pseudonymity is a lesser form of 
anonymity, in which the user reveals a 
special type of identity to the service 
provider known as a pseudonym.
• Typically, new pseudonyms will be 
generated regularly, i.e. pseudonyms are 
typically short-lived.
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Unlinkability
• Unlinkability is a privacy property required 
to support the use of pseudonyms.
• Two pseudonyms are unlinkable if a third 
party cannot tell whether or not they 
belong to the same user.
• In practice, absolute unlinkability is often 
difficult to achieve, since the authorisation 
process may reveal information about the 
user.
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Consent
• In many medical scenarios, the subject may be 
required to give implicit or explicit consent for
– treatment to be given, and
– information to be passed to a practitioner.
• In case a), some measure of non-repudiability 
may be required;
• In case b), the information source will need to 
authenticate the subject – potentially 
problematic since the information source may be 
remote and only communicating with a device 
belonging to the practitioner.
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Auditing
• For a variety of reasons (e.g. to enable 
subsequent investigation on case of a 
dispute) all data handling actions may 
need to be auditable.
• That is, records may need to be kept of all 
significant actions involving sensitive data.
• These records may themselves be a threat 
to user privacy.
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Cryptography for security
• Many of the security issues which must be 
addressed to protect patient privacy can be 
solved using well-understood cryptographic 
techniques, e.g. encryption, signatures, etc.
• However, use of cryptography requires key 
management, typically supported by some kind 
of security infrastructure.
• Key management is also well-studied, e.g. in the 
form of PKIs for reliable public key distribution.
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Privacy Enhancing Technologies
• A huge amount of effort has been devoted to a 
variety of technologies designed to enhance 
user privacy in a distributed environment.
• This includes a wide range of techniques, 
including:
– anonymising networks (MIXes);
– anonymising routing techniques (onion routers);
– anonymous credential systems;
– P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences Project);
• There is a series of conferences (PET ’06, etc.) 
devoted to such technology.
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Anonymous credentials
• Credentials here mean electronic 
documents designed to enable an entity to 
authenticate itself (and/or prove it has 
authorisation to achieve certain 
objectives).
• Anonymous credential systems (protocols) 
enable users to prove possession of 
properties (e.g. authorisations) without 
revealing their identity.
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Trusted computing
• Trusted Computing is a rather different 
technology (examined in greater detail later in 
this talk).
• TC is implemented as a combination of 
hardware and software enhancements to a 
computing platform (e.g. a PC, PDA, server, or 
mobile phone).
• Hardware enhancements typically include a 
TPM (Trusted Platform Module) and 
modifications to the boot ROM.
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Lack of infrastructure
• There are a number of major new challenges 
arising in a mobile environment.
• However, as alluded to previously, at the root of 
most of these problems is the potential lack of a 
single pre-existing managed security 
infrastructure.
• Where such an infrastructure does exist, many 
of the problems become much less fundamental.
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Trusted interactions
• Devices collecting, storing and/or using health 
data may need to share this data with other 
devices.
• E.g. a wireless heart monitor may need to pass 
data to a portable device used by a physician 
which integrates and displays the data to the 
physician.
• Clearly such data transfers should not take place 
without restriction for privacy/security reasons.
• What if the devices interacting do not all belong 
to the same individual?
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Maximising privacy
• Stored data will typically need to be associated 
with a unique individual, and the capability to 
retrieve data for unique individuals is imperative.
• However, this does not mean that the health 
care worker necessarily needs access to unique 
identifying data.
• For example, a paramedic may need to know 
information regarding the allergies of a subject, 
but does not need to know the subject’s name or 
address.
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Authorisation
• Assuming security and privacy measures are in 
place to prevent casual access to healthcare 
data, how is authorised access to be managed?
• Rapid access to critical data is required, perhaps 
without subject authorisation (e.g. if subject is 
incapacitated).
• A mobile health practitioner may only have 
access to mobile devices, and perhaps one or 
more devices (e.g. a smart card, mobile phone, 
…) of the subject.
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General problem
• An ad hoc network is a collection of 
communicating devices with no pre-existing 
relationships or infrastructure.
• A typical scenario for use of such a network is 
an emergency situation, e.g. a major transport 
accident.
• Many security issues arise in establishing 
working relationships in such a network, e.g.:
– Initial trust setting;
– Managing collaborative activities (e.g. routing);
– Authentication, authorisation, …
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Trust establishment
• One fundamental issue for two devices in an ad 
hoc network (with no pre-existing relationship) is 
deciding whether to trust one another (and by 
how much).
• What resources or services should one node 
make available to another?
• Can another node be trusted to provide a 
communications service without eavesdropping, 
manipulating messages, and/or selectively 
dropping packets? 
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Reputation schemes
• One solution is to try to dynamically ‘measure’ the 
trustworthiness of another node.
• Each node maintains an assessment (typically a 
numerical score) of the trustworthiness of its neighbour 
nodes.
• This would typically be derived by monitoring the 
behaviour of the node, possibly combined with 
assessments passed on by other nodes.
• Such schemes are widely used, e.g. on eBay.
• However, such schemes are also easily spoofed.
• Many schemes have been proposed, but the robustness 
of schemes against deliberate attack has rarely been 
assessed.
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Currency schemes
• Another solution proposed in some scenarios, is 
to use a virtual ‘currency’ to reward nodes 
performing service in an ad hoc network.
• Currency needs to be unforgeable!
• Other problems arise – e.g.
– shortages of currency can cause major inefficiencies 
in the network;
– how to start the scheme started, i.e. how does the 
currency get allocated initially?
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Infrastructure needed?
• These dynamic trust management schemes may 
be appropriate in some settings, perhaps where 
data are not of high value.
• However, such a solution seems inadequate in a 
healthcare setting, where users require 
guarantees that their data will not be abused.
• It seems that some kind of security infrastructure 
(to support entity authentication, etc.) will be 
needed.
• This is, of course, problematic, when the devices 
are not managed by a single entity.
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Solutions
• In the remainder of this talk we look at one 
possible solution to the problem of providing a 
ubiquitous security infrastructure.
• We consider the possible use of trusted 
computing to provide this infrastructure.
• This is just one approach - however it appears 
that it can help solve two basic problems:
– provision of a security infrastructure;
– enabling one device to determine its level of trust in a 
another (‘foreign’) device.
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A trusted system
• A trusted system or component is one that behaves in 
the expected manner for a particular purpose.
[Trusted Computing Group – www.trustedcomputinggroup.org]
• This is difficult to achieve for a PC – where typically 
there is no way of telling whether the ‘real’ (uncorrupted) 
Windows is running.
• As a result there is no way of getting any confidence in 
the correct running of applications.  [Even if the 
operating system says that everything is OK, then this 
does not help because it cannot be believed].
• It is even more difficult to prove to a third party that the 
state of a PC is as claimed.
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Fundamental requirements
• First and foremost we need to have a way of achieving 
assurance that the operating system has booted correctly.
• This requires assuming that the PC hardware has not been 
modified; this is made difficult, but not impossible, for the 
attacker by embedding key functions in a dedicated chip –
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
• Need a way of checking the boot process.
• The component that checks the initial boot must be trusted –
the ‘Core Root of Trust’ – this is hardware-based.
• If the loaded software has been checked (and hence is 
reliable), it can check the next software to be loaded, and 
again there is a solid basis for trust – this process is iterated.
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Monitoring the checking
• As well as performing checks during the boot process, 
there needs to be a reliable way of recording the results 
of each of these checks.
• The trusted hardware incorporates hardware registers 
which store hash-codes of software that has been 
loaded – these registers provide a reliable record of all 
the software that has been executed on the trusted 
platform.
• Anyone wishing to check the state of the platform only 
needs to be given the contents of these registers (as 
long as they know what the values ‘ought to be’).
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Building on the trusted base
• This base of trust can be used to support two 
fundamental trusted computing functions:
– Attestation, where a PC can reliably attest to its 
software state to a third party (by describing the 
contents of the registers which store hashes of 
software state);
– Secure storage, where a PC can store data in such a 
way that only if the PC is in a specific trusted state will 
the data be decrypted and available to an application 
(by linking the decryption keys to specific register 
contents).
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Components of a trusted 
computing framework  I
• Shielded locations and protected capabilities:
– Protected capabilities are those capabilities whose correct 
operation is necessary for the platform to be trusted.
– Shielded locations are areas in which data is protected against 
interference or snooping.
• Only protected capabilities have access to shielded locations.
• Attestation:
– Attestation by the TPM;
– Attestation to a trusted platform (incorporating a TPM);
– Attestation of a trusted platform;
– Authentication of a trusted platform.
• Integrity measurement, storage and reporting.
[TCG specification Architecture Overview]
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Components of a trusted 
computing framework  II
Microsoft’s additional components:
• Process isolation, whereby an integrated 
isolation kernel facilitates the execution of 
several compartments/domains in parallel on the 
same machine, and controls the access of 
applications/OSs running in these compartments 
to system resources.
• A secure path from the peripherals to trusted 
applications.
[Microsoft Security Model for NGSCB]
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Components of a trusted 
computing framework  III
• Confidentiality and integrity protection of application code and data 
during execution.
• Confidentiality and integrity protection of application code and data 
during storage.
• Integrity protection of the operating system and underlying 
hardware so that the above properties can be satisfied.
• Platform attestation.
• A trusted path to the user so that confidentiality of user input can be 
assured.
• Secure channels to devices and between applications to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of communicated data.
• Reliability assurance, necessitating size restrictions on trusted 
critical components.
[Sadeghi and Stüble: Bridging the Gap between TCPA/Palladium and Personal Security]
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Components of a trusted 
computing framework  IV
• Attestation – provides remote assurance of the 
state of the hardware and software stack running 
on a computer.
• Isolation – execution 
environments/domains/compartments.
• Secure storage:
– Encryption;
– Sealing (binding of data to specific machine state).
• Secure I/O.
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Deployment of trusted computing
• The TCG specifications allow many possible 
implementation architectures on a variety of 
platform types.
• Most effort into PC implementations – many PCs 
now being shipped with TPMs, and Windows 
Vista will build on presence of TPM.
• However, range of working groups within TCG 
looking at other platforms.
• This include Mobile Phone Working Group 
(MPWG) – profiling TCG specifications for 
mobile phone use.
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Applications – ubiquitous infrastructure
• Every TCG-compliant platform comes pre-
equipped with an asymmetric key pair and a set 
of certificates/credentials.
• These provide a basis by which any platform can 
authenticate any other platform, and learn the 
platform type, and the level of physical security 
provided.
• This provides a simple basis for a key 
management infrastructure (a ubiquitous PKI).
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Applications – stable identities
• What does authentication mean when one entity does 
not know in advance the name of the other entity with 
which it is communicating?
• We can authenticate against attributes rather than name.
• Trusted Computing enables devices to remain 
anonymous, yet their properties to be authenticated 
(using credentials issued, e.g. by the platform 
manufacturer and/or third party testing laboratories).
• It also enables degree of ‘linkability’ to be selected, e.g. 
enabling all interactions with one third party to be linked, 
but no linking between interactions with different third 
parties (hence notion of ‘stable’ unidirectional identities)
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Applications – trusted interactions
• By exploiting the attestation function of TCG, 
one platform can determine the software state of 
another.
• That is, one device can be sure that the data 
passed to another device will be handled by 
trusted software before transferring the data.
• In a simple system (e.g. a simple mobile device) 
TCG attestation may be sufficient.
• In a complex system (e.g. a PC), the TCG 
attestation will need to be applied to a 
virtualisation layer, which will then guarantee the 
integrity of software running on top of it.
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Applications – secure data storage
• TCG enables one device to ensure that data 
passed to another TCG device will only be 
available in specific circumstances.
• The device stores data encrypted such that it will 
only be decrypted if the device is in a specific 
configuration.
• Thus stored data can be made inaccessible to 
unauthorised software and even the owner of 
the device.
• This could be applied both to health care data 
itself and to audit trails created by health care 
applications.
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Fundamental problems
• We have identified fundamental problems 
that need to be solved to realise full 
potential of mobile ubiquitous computing 
for healthcare:
– need for a ubiquitous security infrastructure to 
support secure communications between 
mobile devices; 
– need for one device to be able to verify the 
conditions under which data will be stored, 
handled, and retransmitted by another device.
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Directions for future research
• Can trusted computing genuinely realise 
all the security infrastructure needs of 
future pervasive computing environment?
• Who will be the trusted third parties to 
support the trusted computing based 
security infrastructure?
• What if some mobile devices are trusted 
computing enabled and others are not?
• What other solutions are there?
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More information
• TCG:  www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
• MPWG: www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/groups/mobile
• OpenTC (an EU Integrated Project with the goal 
of providing open source software supporting 
TC):  www.opentc.net
• Trusted Computing books:
– S. Pearson (ed.), Trusted Computing Platforms: 
TCPA Technology in Context, Prentice-Hall, 2002.
– C. J. Mitchell (ed.), Trusted Computing, IEE, 2005.
– S. W. Smith, Trusted Computing Platforms: Design 
and Applications, Springer-Verlag, 2005. 
